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Law Protecting Rights: Restoring
the law of self-determination
in the neo-colonial world
Amy Maguire
Introduction
In light of the continuing state dominance of international legal
relations, it is questionable whether international law adequately
protects the right of self-determination. Yet, as it is enshrined in
international law, self-determination retains great emancipatory
promise. It is therefore essential that the law of self-determination, and
its means of implementation, further evolve in order to harness the
right’s full potential in the wide range of twenty-first century claims
to the right. In this paper I consider self-determination in relation to
the contemporary rights claims of Irish nationalists and Indigenous
peoples in Australia. This comparison allows for an analysis both of
the impacts of colonialism in the present and of the various means by
which self-determination may be asserted today. I am advancing two
central arguments: firstly, that self-determination retains a mission
of decolonisation in the twenty-first century; and secondly, that a
‘human rights approach’ to self-determination presents the best means
of advancing the rights of contemporary claimants while protecting
the rights of non-claimants.
Alongside doctrinal legal analysis, I have conducted 28 in-depth
research interviews in Ireland and Australia in order to consider
self-determination, its definitions and its scope from a ‘bottom-up’
perspective, and to develop a critique of the state of the law in the area.
The rationale for using a socio-legal method to explore an international
law topic is to bring human voices to international legal analysis, and to
advocate the opening of international legal discourse to the perspectives
of non-state actors. In both research sites, interviews were conducted
with lawyers, academics, human rights activists, community workers
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and politicians, with the aim of gaining both a breadth of perspectives
and a depth of analysis from people intimately engaged with the issues
of self-determination. Data from this qualitative research is included
in this article, first, to shed light on the meaning of self-determination
and, second, to demonstrate some of the arenas in which contemporary
claimants to the right identify the stifling influence of colonialism.
This paper explores some of the key practical and theoretical
proposals which have emerged through my analysis of interview
data and secondar y material, particularly in relation to selfdetermination and colonialism. First I briefly consider the meaning
of self-determination itself. Secondly I argue that colonial experience
continues to impinge upon peoples’ capacity to assert and realise selfdetermination. Finally I propose some means by which law’s protection
of self-determination might be extended in order to fulfil the right’s
emancipatory potential.

Self-determination: Legal status and meaning
The concept of self-determination has its origins in the Enlightenment,
but it did not emerge as a principle of international law until the early
twentieth century. During the post–World War One peace talks in
Versailles, US President Woodrow Wilson began to talk about ‘selfdetermination’ as ‘an imperative principle of action’ guiding the
re-drawing of the maps of Europe (1918). In the Wilsonian sense,
however, self-determination was purely the right of peoples when
organised as ‘nations’, and its application was in practice limited to
those new states which the victorious powers intended to create out
of the ruins of war. In recognising self-determination only where this
was politically expedient, the dominant forces in the international
community at this time established a precedent of the dominance
of politics over law which continues to impinge upon the right in
the twenty-first century. Just as the intensely hierarchical nature of
international relations during the early twentieth century prevented
the rights claims of colonised peoples being treated equally to the
rights of existing states (Ishay 2004), so do contemporary claimant
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peoples struggle to make their claims heard on the international
stage. Nevertheless, the term self-determination gained a foothold in
international legal discourse at Versailles.
Self-determination then took on the status of a firm pillar
of international law following the Second World War, when it was
included as a foundation principle in the United Nations Charter
(Brownlie 2003). Building on this precedent, self-determination
assumed a central place in the international Bill of Rights. The right
was enshrined and defined in Common Article 1 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.

This statement is echoed in relation to Indigenous peoples by the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the
UN General Assembly in September 2007.
On this legal basis, over the past four decades self-determination
has become the most significant and commonly asserted of the human
rights owed to peoples rather than individuals. The right stands in
opposition to the absolute dominance of states within the international
order. It is crucial in enabling communities to preserve and protect
their distinct identities (Daes 1993). Indeed, the UN Rapporteur on
self-determination described the right as ‘an essential condition or
prerequisite … for the genuine existence of the other human rights
and freedoms’ (Gros Espiell 1980: [59]). While the most significant
engagement of self-determination to date has been the project of
decolonisation, Common Article 1 of the twin covenants confirms
that the right has universal application (Crawford 2001). Forty years
on, this provision stands as a positive and binding statement that the
domination of one people by another will not be legally tolerated
(McCorquodale 1995). As will be discussed below, however, the
strength of self-determination in legal terms has been undermined
by political realities.
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Frederic Kirgis has described self-determination as a right with
many ‘faces’. These include, but are not limited to, secession, freedom
from colonial domination, integration with an existing state, limited
autonomy within a state, and protection of minority groups (Kirgis
1994). Practical examples demonstrate that the right may manifest
across a broad spectrum, and while it is this flexibility that makes selfdetermination uniquely adaptable to the needs of all peoples, the lack
of a constant and defined application for the right has prompted James
Crawford (2001) to critique the right as lex obscura or uncertain law.
To give human context to the meaning of self-determination, I
have asked interview respondents what the right means to them on
a practical level. I argue that the term ‘self-determination’ offers the
best clue for how to define the concept; the meaning of the right must
be contextualised and defined by peoples themselves in their unique
circumstances. For some people, the right begins at an individual level
before taking on its role within the collective:
I think self-determination is within yourself, being proud of who you are.
Aboriginal people find that really hard because you have all these people
knocking you down all the time (Mundine 2006).

Indeed, self-determination may be seen to actuate on several
layered levels:
Self-determination means the right of a nation to determine its own
political, social, economic and cultural affairs, and its own relations to
other peoples and other nations. Within that it also means the rights
of specific communities, whether they be geographical communities
or communities of interest, for example gendered, racialised or ethnic
communities, and it means that they can do exactly the same things in the
context of the nation. It is for the individual too (Ó Broin 2006).

As Ó Broin asserts, self-determination is often bound up with
political autonomy, yet Paul O’Connor demonstrates that the right
is also important for dispossessed peoples in terms of culture and
identity:
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I certainly would argue that freedom in the political sphere also means
freedom in the social and cultural spheres as well. For instance, I find it
frustrating that my children are using textbooks that have got no cultural
relevance to them (O’Connor 2006).

Just as, depending on context, self-determination can be understood
in political, social, economic, cultural or other terms, so too can
discrete exercises of the right be far more localised. As Linda Burney
explains, not every exercise of self-determination must result in full
independence for a people:
The international definition is a fine set of words, but realistically it
would be difficult to find many places in the world where the practice
of self-determination includes all of those elements. In the context of an
individual community in New South Wales — Bega, La Perouse, Yamba or
wherever — it is about Aboriginal people being able to take responsibility
for decision-making that will affect them (Burney 2006).

The highly contextualised nature of self-determination represents
one aspect of the right which powerful international actors, especially
nation states, have typically failed or refused to understand. Certainly
some self-determination claims involve challenges to state sovereignty
and existing borders, such as those asserted by Irish nationalists,
Palestinians and Basques. However, many other claims, notably those
typically made by Indigenous peoples in Australia, seek autonomy
within existing nation states and promote the notion of co-existing
forms of sovereignty within the same territory.
The variety of characterisations of self-determination offered
by participants in this research demonstrate that the definition in
international law is but a starting point for peoples seeking control over
their own destinies. Indeed, attempts to impose restrictive definitions
of the right actually serve to deny the right’s true nature and potential.
Only a self-determining people can determine what the right means
for them. This is a difficult fact for law and lawyers to face, however,
and examples from both Irish and Indigenous Australian contexts show
that the right is currently inadequately protected by international law
and institutions. As I discuss in the following section, those engaged
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in the evolution of the international law of self-determination must
be confronted with the fact that colonial experiences continue to stifle
peoples’ achievement of self-determination.

Self-determination and the
mission of decolonisation
Some key theorists of colonialism have influenced my exploration of
the relationship between colonialism and self-determination. I follow
Frantz Fanon’s view that the history of colonialism is ‘the history of
pillage’, and that colonialism imposes material and moral violence
which must be struggled against (1965: 41, Sharawy 2003). This
research has included in-depth interviews with people struggling
for self-determination in Ireland and Australia, in order to listen
to the voices of the colonised and honour their demands for selfdetermination (Sartre in Fanon 1965: 12). I also concur with Judge
Ammoun’s famous separate opinions in the Namibia (1971) and Western
Sahara (1975) cases before the International Court of Justice that
colonialism is a plague which causes a distortion in history for the
colonised. The judge argued that self-determination is the only means
by which a claimant people may overcome that historical distortion
and reassert their independence. The greatest obstacle to claimant
peoples who seek to use the right in this way is that international law
has not yet engaged with its Eurocentric bias, with the result that
colonialism rarely features prominently in international legal analysis
(Anghie 2004: 34). Instead, as Antony Anghie (2004) recognises,
having been born from colonialism, international law now reproduces
colonialism at every turn.
Some international legal commentators have argued in recent
times that the process of decolonisation, which reached its peak in the
1960s and 1970s, has all but reached its conclusion (Pearson 2006a).
For example, Christine Bell (2005) finds colonialism to be a fairly
unhelpful tool of analysis in relation to sovereignty debates in Ireland
and asserts more generally that self-determination solutions which do
not alter existing borders are typically more appropriate in the present
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day. I argue, however, that evidence from both Ireland and Australia
demonstrates the continued influence of colonialism over claims to selfdetermination. International legal actors and institutions are challenged
to confront both the legacy and the contemporary experience of
colonialism if international law is to offer adequate protection to the
right of self-determination and act more forcefully to compel states
to respect the right. This research is one site in which the influence of
colonialism over self-determination claims can be made more explicit
in international legal discourse.

Case studies from Ireland and
Indigenous Australia
In many ways the circumstances of nationalists in the North of Ireland
and Indigenous peoples in Australia could not be more different.
Indeed, the key distinction between the two case studies is that Irish
nationalists claim self-determination in the form of a reunited Ireland,
thus challenging the status of existing state borders, whilst almost all
self-determination claims advanced by Indigenous peoples in Australia
propose some form of autonomous solution within the existing state
structure. Yet this essential difference is one of the two most important
reasons for comparing the two cases. Consideration of different types
of self-determination claims illuminates the adaptable nature of the
right and challenges the typical statist view that self-determination
necessarily entails a claim to secession and a challenge to a state’s
territorial integrity.
The other important reason for this comparison of the Irish
nationalist and Indigenous Australian claims is that both claims
are heavily influenced by a colonial experience which has not been
adequately recognised either at the domestic or international level.
Irish nationalists and Indigenous peoples in Australia continue to
experience ‘settler colonialism’ (see Clayton 1996). This experience
is distinct from the ‘salt-water’ colonialism suffered by the many
recently formed nation states whose right to self-determination was
upheld by international law through the project of decolonisation.
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Contemporary legal commentators have recognised that the salt-water
test of colonialism, which aimed to impose predictability by ruling out
claims from peoples not separated by an ocean from their colonisers,
was manifestly unjust (Hurrell 2003) and indefensible (Wippman
1998). The maintenance of the salt-water test throughout the project
of decolonisation has marginalised peoples who have experienced
other forms of colonialism.
In this section I explore the responses of interview participants in
both Ireland and Australia. In each interview, respondents were asked
whether they identified a continuing colonial influence over their
community’s claim to self-determination. There was almost universal
agreement across the 28 interviews conducted that colonialism does
continue to impinge upon contemporary self-determination claims
in Ireland and by Indigenous peoples in Australia. However, as this is
a qualitative study, the depth of the data gathered is more interesting
than the degree of correlation between responses. Not only did
almost all participants agree that colonialism was a continuing force
in their lives, but they gave rich and diverse explanations of the real
effects of colonialism. This type of analysis has rarely been included
in international legal discourse.
Ireland
In Ireland, the partitioned north-eastern six counties represent a last
vestige of British colonialism. The border of 1920 remains in place,
despite its international illegitimacy and status as a ‘religion-linked,
political gerrymander’ (Swan 1986: 139). The legacy of the colonial
mindset, promoted by the British state in Ireland through a range of
means as recently as the twentieth century, may still be seen in the
social imperialism expressed by some British unionist politicians who
resent power-sharing and negotiation with Irish nationalists. Further,
sectarianism is reinforced by the British state as is clear in the case of
John Taylor, a former unionist politician who in 1991 advised a group
of young people that one in three Catholics was either a murderer or
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a supporter of murder (McKay 2000: 363–4). Taylor now holds a life
peerage in the House of Lords.
In all but one of my interviews in Ireland respondents recognised
a continued colonial British influence in the North of Ireland.
Contemporary colonialism in Ireland, however, is less explicit than
in past centuries. In arguing that colonialism relates not to distance
but to type of administration, Robert McCorquodale (2006) asks: ‘Is
the type of administration a foreign administration over those who
are different and who don’t share the same approach?’ The use of the
term ‘foreign’ is complicated in the Northern Irish context because
around half of the constituents of that jurisdiction identify themselves
as British, ‘Northern Irish’ or ‘Ulstermen’ and remain accepting of
British governance. For Irish nationalists across the island, however,
British rule is both foreign and different in approach from how
they imagine governance in a unified Ireland. Like McCorquodale,
Bernadette McAliskey (2006) rejects the salt-water approach to colonial
categorisation, finding that the British presence in Ireland has never
been appropriately named as colonial due to the erroneous perception
that colonies must be distant from the imperial power. Further,
several respondents to this study identified the unaccountability of the
British ruling class as a signifier of continued colonialism. Anthony
Coughlan (2006) admits finding colonial terms somewhat simplistic,
but nevertheless states: ‘The classic characterisation of colonialism was
a subordinate people who had their laws made by others, by foreigners,
and Britain does still do that in Northern Ireland’. Terry Enright
(2006) is far more explicit in his condemnation of the unaccountable
British politicians and bureaucrats who continue to share power with
the Northern Ireland Assembly: ‘These people are like a secret society,
behind closed doors, who still think of us as the natives and still think
that the natives have to be told how to live and what to do’.
A further active legacy of colonialism in Ireland is the failure of
the British state to confront its own role in the conflict. In August
2007 Britain withdrew the last representatives of its wartime garrison
in Ireland, leaving what it terms a ‘peacetime’ garrison of no more
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than 5000 soldiers. However, Britain continues to promote what
is known as the ‘community relations’ conception of the conflict
in Ireland, which depicts the British state as the neutral arbiter of
a community-based conflict. Paul O’Connor, director of the Pat
Finucane Centre — an NGO focused on gaining justice for families of
those killed by the state during the conflict — rejects the community
relations analysis. He argues that the state’s role in collusion with
police and loyalists in the murder of civilians, the shoot-to-kill policy,
Bloody Sunday, torture and detention without trial (see Larkin 2004)
evidence the state’s role as a combatant rather than a mediator in the
conflict (O’Connor 2006). Indeed, during the period known as the
Troubles British soldiers were directly responsible for the killings
of 301 people, including 138 Catholic civilians and 20 Protestant
civilians. On 25 June 2007, despite comprehensive findings of state
collusion in the murders of several civilians during the conflict, the
Public Prosecutions Service announced that it would not prosecute
any member of the British security forces or police (Press Notice:
Public Prosecution Service — Conclusion on Stevens III 25 June 2007).
Immediately following Canadian judge Cory’s recommendation that
an independent inquiry be held into the killing of Catholic solicitor
Pat Finucane, the Westminster parliament passed a new Inquiries Act
2005, which enables the state to withdraw incriminating information
from the defence, prosecution and the judge. Belfast lawyer Niall
Murphy (2006) questions how truth and justice can be served under
this new statute, which is clearly designed to protect the interests of
the state over the citizens.
A further aspect of continued colonial influence identified by Irish
respondents to this study was the dominance of British culture over
Irish culture within many areas of social life. An obviously contentious
display of British culture occurs each July during the Orange marching
season. In 2006, having established a Parades Commission as a means
of developing rights-based and negotiated solutions to contentious
marches, the Northern Ireland Office appointed an Orangeman
previously found liable for unfair employment practices against
nationalists to head the commission. In contrast, those with Irish
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identities face greater obstacles in freely expressing those identities.
Paul O’Connor (2006) complains that his children’s education is not
culturally relevant, because British points of reference — such as
visiting Big Ben — are used in children’s textbooks. Of particular
current concern is the inability of either the British government or
the Northern Ireland Assembly to give appropriate legislative support
to the Irish language (Enright 2006). Many people promote the use
of the Irish language as a means of claiming their cultural identity
(Murphy 2006). Under the European Convention on Regional and
Minority Languages and the Good Friday Agreement, Britain was
obliged to establish legislation protecting the rights of the rapidly
growing number of Irish speakers in the north of Ireland. Further,
Britain made a commitment to introduce this legislation in the St
Andrews agreement which preceded the recent re-establishment of
the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly. A public consultation round
was held and the overwhelming majority of responses were in favour of
rights-based legislative protection for the language. However, Britain
failed to introduce the legislation before power over cultural rights
was devolved to the unionist-dominated Assembly. The Assembly,
dominated by the Ian Paisley–founded Democratic Unionist Party,
appears to have abandoned any commitment to enacting the legislation,
with DUP member Nelson McCausland linking the Irish language
to the IRA armed campaign and describing efforts to promote it as a
form of ‘cultural rearmament’ (2007).
Australia
All Indigenous respondents to this research identified a continuing
colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Australian
state. In this regard they echoed the famous comment on contemporary
colonialism made by Yawuru elder and Aboriginal spokesman, Patrick
Dodson, in his influential Fourth Annual Vincent Lingiari Memorial
Lecture of 1999. Dodson titled his lecture ‘Until the Chains are Broken:
Aboriginal Unfinished Business’. The title was a reference to an excerpt
from Frank Hardy’s book The Unlucky Australians:
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Will I, having written it, be free to turn to other books and obsessions,
will you, having read it, be free to turn to the pursuit of happiness, will
the lucky country remain free while the unlucky Australians are in
chains? (Hardy 2006)

The colonial ‘chains’ which continue to bind Indigenous peoples
in Australia, in Dodson’s conception, are diverse and diffuse; in all,
he identified 17 elements of ‘Aboriginal unfinished business’ which
must be settled before the colonial legacy may be overcome. As was
reflected by the variety of responses from Indigenous participants in
this research, contemporary colonialism in Australia goes far beyond
the historical and continuing dispossession of land and resources to
encompass myriad forms of domination and disempowerment.
Even in the post-Mabo period, as Irene Watson states (2006),
Australian legal and public institutions have failed to recognise or
respect continuing Aboriginal sovereignty. The High Court has
stated categorically that it has no jurisdiction to inquire into the
acquisition of sovereignty by Britain in Australia (Mabo v Queensland
(No 2), hereinafter Mabo), and consequently a native title regime has
been developed which requires Indigenous claimants to establish an
unbroken link between their ‘traditional laws and customs’ as practised
at the time of European colonisation and those laws and customs which
they continue to practise today in connection with their traditional
lands (Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria, Native
Title Act 1993 (Cth) section 223). Nor has the Australian Constitution
evolved to the point where it would drive, or at least facilitate, a
fundamental alteration in the relationship between Indigenous peoples
and the Australian state (Behrendt 2006). The absence of recognition
of Indigenous sovereignty by the Australian legal and constitutional
framework is hardly surprising, however, in light of Linda Burney’s
comment that the prior occupation of Australia by Indigenous people
was not legally recognised until the Mabo decision of 1992 (Burney
2006). The framework of ‘settlement’ and ‘terra nullius’ which
justified the colonisation of Australia in the eyes of Anglo-Australian
law meant that the colonial relationship did not develop to the point
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reached in other comparable colonial countries, such as New Zealand/
Aotearoa, the United States and Canada, where prior ownership was
acknowledged through treaties (Calma 2006).
One of the key practical legacies of this failure to recognise
Indigenous sovereignty has been the development of administrative
frameworks which isolate and patronise Indigenous people in the
present day. This is evident in the lack of proportional representation of
Indigenous people in important social institutions such as parliaments,
the judiciary and the education system, a circumstance which Irabinna
Rigney (2006) believes demonstrates the ongoing disproportion of
power between Indigenous and non-Indigenous in Australia. Aden
Ridgeway, at the time of interview the only Indigenous senator in
the Commonwealth Parliament, asserts that a consequence of this lack
of representation is a governmental attitude that Indigenous people
remain, in a sense, ‘wards of the state’. Ridgeway (2006) argues
that this attitude results in a colonial governmental approach which
emphasises Indigenous disadvantage, and suggests that governments are
best placed to decide for Indigenous peoples how their circumstances
might be improved. A parallel concern expressed by Professor Mick
Dodson (2006) is that the disempowerment of Indigenous people
means that governments typically make decisions affecting the lives of
individuals and communities without seeking or gaining Indigenous
consent. Dodson gives the example of the 2006–2007 abolition of the
permit system in the Northern Territory, whereby it was no longer
necessary for outsiders to gain permits to enter private and freehold
Aboriginal property. As is the case for Irish nationalists in Northern
Ireland, Indigenous people in Australia continue to identify a colonial
legacy in the marginalisation of their voices and ignorance of their
concerns.
An abiding and unfortunate consequence of the marginalisation of
Indigenous people from positions of influence in Australian society is
the continued prevalence of racist and discriminatory attitudes towards
Indigenous people. Larissa Behrendt (2006) asserts that Australia has
not changed psychologically as a country, and that while the dominant

24

Law Protecting Rights

community appears to resent public debates about racism or Indigenous
rights, a key concern for many Indigenous people is bringing an end
to the discrimination they routinely suffer. Arguably one of the key
indicators of this abiding discrimination towards Indigenous people
is the replacement and erasure of Indigenous cultures that continues
in the present day (Rigney 2006). The problem of cultural erasure is
emphasised as a key colonial barrier to Indigenous self-determination
by Noel Pearson, who comments:
There’s never been agreement by the country to say that Indigenous
peoples are entitled to maintain their distinct identities, to maintain
their languages, to maintain the integrity of their relationship with their
traditional lands — we’ve not reached the point where those things have
been proclaimed as foundations for moving forward (Pearson 2006b).

Encapsulated in Pearson’s comment is an idea which is also inherent
in a wide range of comments made by participants in this research —
namely, that colonialism abides wherever there is a failure to recognise
and respect every people’s equal right to self-determination.
The challenge for international law
Such examples demonstrate the gaps between the international legal
standards set for self-determination and the political will of nation states
to protect peoples’ right to self-determination. Britain, particularly
during the sovereignty dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands,
has been one of the most prominent champions of the right to selfdetermination in the international forum, notably commenting that
the right is owed to all peoples, even those inside British borders (UK
representative to the UN 1982: 432). Yet, so often in the case of the
Irish people in Northern Ireland, Britain has disregarded its obligations
and commitments under international law by failing to make space
for the expression of their right to self-determination. Similarly,
the conclusion of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (1999) that amendments to Australia’s native title laws
led by the Howard government were in breach of racial discrimination
standards did not persuade Australia to alter its course. Indigenous
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respondents to my study have said that the Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples which was recently adopted by the UN was of
such significance because it is the only legal instrument they have with
which to confront state intransigence on self-determination (Davis
2006, Dodson 2006). Clearly, then, the evolution of international law
must be accompanied by renewed political will on the part of states to
respect and enable self-determination for all peoples.

Restoring the law of self-determination
through international law
For claimants of self-determination who continue to struggle against
the suppression of their rights through colonialism, the most pressing
concern remains survival and the maintenance of distinct identities.
Another key question, however, is whether international law can evolve
in the twenty-first century to ensure that self-determination does not
lose its emancipatory potential. I turn now to some suggestions of
means by which the utility of self-determination may be enhanced.
Decolonising the law of self-determination
In order to achieve its contemporary mission of decolonisation, the
law of self-determination must itself be decolonised. A key means of
achieving this is by enabling the variety of legitimate manifestations
of the right. It has always suited states to depict self-determination
as inherently threatening to state sovereignty, but in law the right
is capable of being realised as anything from independence from
colonial rule to the exercise of autonomy within state borders
or the enjoyment of democratic governance in an existing state
arrangement (Kirgis 1994: 307). Robert McCorquodale (2006)
regards this statist tendency to emphasise the risk of secession as a
‘deliberate misunderstanding’ designed to maintain state control over
sovereignty at all costs. Undoubtedly the Irish nationalist claim to selfdetermination does challenge existing state borders, but Indigenous
peoples in Australia very rarely assert self-determination claims which
challenge the sovereignty of the Australian state. A decolonised law of
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self-determination must countenance the variety of assertions of the
right, and in doing so should motivate the international community
to engage with each claim on its own merits.
An allied means of decolonising the law of self-determination
is through breaking down the artificial dichotomy which has been
proposed between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ self-determination. In
this characterisation, external self-determination, or independent
statehood, is regarded as highly threatening and only permitted in cases
of severe oppression by a dominant state. Internal self-determination,
such as limited autonomy within existing borders, is typically preferred.
I oppose the use of this division in international legal discourse as
unhelpful and designed to always preference the political interests of
states. The statist world has been definitively eroded (Falk 2000: 112)
in law — if not in practice — and the artificial opposition between
external and internal self-determination is inapplicable given ‘the
reality of multiple human associational patterns in today’s world’
(Anaya 1996: 81). The law of self-determination can be decolonised
by abandoning these arbitrary categories and empowering claimant
peoples to frame self-determination in their own terms.
Group identity and the state
The evolution of self-determination in the twenty-first century is also
required to develop state acceptance of the right’s continued place
in the international legal order. This is an area for the intervention
of international law and legal analysis since, as Antonio Cassese
recognises, the law on self-determination presently fails to countenance
the claims of, or provide legal remedies to, ethnic, national, religious,
cultural or linguistic minorities:
In short … international law takes a ‘statist view of self-determination’. Of
course, political stability and the territorial integrity of States are important
values that need not be disregarded. … On the other hand, one cannot fail
to note that international law could provide a host of contingency solutions
which while not undermining the international legal order, would be
likely to pay regard to the aspirations of those groups and minorities that
suffer from discrimination and oppression (1995: 328).
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If international law is currently complicit in supporting an overly
statist interpretation of self-determination then it has a role to play in
making that right a less threatening proposition for states. Arguably
the human rights approach to self-determination (discussed below) has
the potential to promote this development in that it makes secession
and conflict less likely outcomes of self-determination claims based
in a particular group identity and builds in rights protections for
those with competing worldviews. To enhance this outcome states
ought to question their traditional opposition to assertions of group
identity. State engagement with people’s claims to self-determination
would be in keeping with international law’s acknowledgement that
political boundaries are legitimate because they protect groups as well
as individuals (Binder 1992–1993: 225).
Nationalist and claimant movements, for their part, could respond
to an increased state engagement with self-determination claims by
rejecting exclusivist modes of definition and embracing pluralism.
In Ireland Sinn Féin is attempting such a transition by moving away
from the narrow cultural focus of Irish nationalism towards civic
republicanism and inclusivity (Ó Broin 2006). It is to be hoped that
future conceptions of self-determination in the Irish context can reconceive of group identity as a unifying notion and move beyond the
stultifying question of which group deserves what towards arrangements
which advance the interests of all people on the island.
Empowering peoples through an inclusive
international legal system
Almost thirty years ago Lee Buchheit challenged international law to
affirm self-determination’s continued currency and avoid ‘an uncritical
affirmation of the supremacy of the “sovereign” state’ (Buchheit 1978:
7). The capacity of self-determination to force international actors
to question the assumptions inherent in international law could be
enhanced through a restructuring of international legal institutions
(Lâm 1992). Should the international legal system be opened to the
participation of peoples, this may also assist in overcoming a key
paradox — that the international community ‘upholds the right to
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self-determination but can do so little to provide for its consistent
or effective implementation’ (Hurrell 2003: 297). In proposing the
development of an ‘inclusive international legal system’ McCorquodale
(2004) notes the precedents already set by the evolution of selfdetermination, which was driven largely by peoples, often with the
opposition of states. Such a development is appropriate in light of selfdetermination’s status as a right of peoples against states (Crawford
1988), and by the right’s significance as an essential condition for the
realisation of all other human rights (Gros Espiell 1980, Kolodner
1994–1995).
An inclusive international legal system has the potential to enhance
popular agency and participation and to provide more accountable
and independent systems of oversight for self-determination processes
taking place within nations. The United Nations Charter famously
begins ‘We the Peoples’. If the international legal system is to honour
this phrasing, particularly in relation to the right of self-determination
which serves peoples rather than states, it must combine strategies
of empowerment with strategies of accessibility (Murphy 2006),
something which may in part be achieved through the development
of an inclusive international legal system.
‘Peoples’ v ‘territories’ v ‘human rights’:
Do we have to define the self?
In traditional approaches to self-determination it has typically
been argued that it is necessary to define the ‘self ’ claiming selfdetermination. A 1990 UNESCO report brought together the most
commonly proposed definitions of a ‘people’, notably emphasising
the need for the group to share some objective characteristics such
as common ethnicity, language or culture, and the importance of a
common subjective desire to be identified as a people (International
Meeting of Experts on the Further Study of the Concept of the Right
of People 1990). However this ‘peoples’ approach is problematic in that
it fails to recognise how peoples may change over time, it potentially
enables peoples to be engineered in order to attain political ends,
few individuals can happily state that they are members of one single
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people, and no single definition of people-hood exists (McCorquodale
1994).
In contrast, some commentators favour a ‘territories’ approach
to self-determination, although this has not gained the same level of
adherence. The territories approach focused historically on colonial
boundaries, conceiving of self-determination as a peaceful vehicle for
enabling the transfer of colonial territories from an imperial power to
a colonial people. The key problem of the territories approach is that
it ignores the range of means by which self-determination may be
exercised, and in this way ‘is a reminder of the reckless indifference
to peoples shown by those who decided on territorial boundaries after
the First World War’ (McCorquodale 1994: 869).
A ‘human rights’ approach has been promoted by Robert
McCorquodale (1994) as a means of providing clearer rules of
adjudication for self-determination claims. The human rights approach
evaluates self-determination claims within the context of the whole
human rights framework, and especially those rights which may
conflict with a people’s assertion of self-determination. In focusing not
on ‘who is the self?’ but on how self-determination will be exercised,
this approach aims to enable the concurrent protection of the whole
range of human rights to their fullest extent (McCorquodale 2006):
While the human rights approach does not make it possible to say in
the abstract which peoples have the right of self-determination and the
extent of any exercise of this right, it does provide a framework to enable
every situation to be considered and all the relevant rights and interests
to be taken into account, balanced and analysed … (McCorquodale
1994: 885).

In order to explore how the human rights approach to selfdetermination would work in practice, McCorquodale (1994)
considers the notion that most human rights are not absolute values,
but rather that limitations may sometimes be imposed to enable rights
to interact in the real conditions of social life, as is the case with selfdetermination. He states the general legal rules that any limitations
which are imposed on the exercise of human rights are only imposed to
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protect other rights and the interests of society, and that any limitations
imposed are to be interpreted narrowly. So while self-determination
applies wherever a people is subject to oppression it is subject to the
presumption that exercises of self-determination cannot be permitted
to destroy or impair the other human rights also enshrined in the
international legal framework.
McCorquodale’s proposal finds support in some international
legal commentary. James Anaya conceives of self-determination as
‘a configurative principle’ of human rights law which is intertwined
with individual human rights standards (1996: 77). When the right
is considered in this light the human rights approach appears both
logical and well-adapted to twenty-first century conceptions of the
true significance of human rights in international relations. Indeed,
Gerry Simpson argues that the only means of saving self-determination
from a ‘descent into incoherence’ is an expansive interpretation of the
right which recognises its links with autonomy, democracy, cultural
self-expression and human rights (1996: 259). A renewal of such links
through the human rights approach may also allay the fears of some who
regard self-determination as divisive or dangerous. For example, Louis
Beres (1994) has called for the balancing of self-determination with the
needs of the entire global community in order to protect against the
more extreme and violent out-workings of separatism, ethnic conflict
and militaristic nationalism. The human rights approach is the only
strategy yet proposed which attends to these concerns with both realism
regarding the interests of the international community and a respect
for the fundamental entitlements of individuals and peoples.
The human rights approach has obvious potential to overcome some
of the weaknesses of the human rights framework which currently limit
the capacity of claimant peoples to fully realise self-determination.
McCorquodale’s strategy responds to the lack of enforcement power
in international law by proposing a more conciliatory framework of
negotiating self-determination. In this context it is foreseeable that
states could be persuaded to sit with claimant peoples ‘at the same
table’ on the proviso that a relationship of mutual goodwill could
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be established. This element of the strategy also responds to the
marginalisation of claimant peoples from international legal dialogue
in that the voices of claimants may seem less threatening to states
if they are expressed in a framework of negotiation. Further, the
difficulty created by the dominance of political considerations in state
responses to self-determination claims is addressed by the human rights
approach. Arguably the evaluation of self-determination according
to the ‘coherent legal framework’ of the international law on human
rights may make politics a less decisive factor and instead promote
negotiated agreements. The Canadian Supreme Court appeared to
favour this outcome in giving its opinion on the potential secession
of Québec from the Canadian federation. In that case it was held that
a Québécois vote in favour of secession would have to be followed by
‘principled negotiations’ with the other stakeholders in the federation
to ensure that all rights were protected to the fullest degree (Reference
re Secession of Québec).
Some respondents to this study gave specific examples of how the
human rights approach could apply positively in practice. According to
Kieran McEvoy (2006), ‘absolutist’ assertions of self-determination in
Northern Ireland have been disaggregated over the past several years of
the Irish peace process. Today, issues of entitlement, such as claims of
British unionists to the ‘right to march’ or parade, are discussed more
frequently in terms of competing rights frameworks, thus developing
more practical solutions than were possible in the past. In Australia,
too, the human rights approach lessens the risk of rights claims being
rejected solely on the basis that they threaten the already protected
rights of others. Professor Mick Dodson (2006) agrees that the cause
of reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in
Australia can only be achieved through a balancing of all rights and
interests, as is advocated by the human rights approach. It would be
mutually beneficial for states, claimant peoples and all others whose
rights are engaged by a self-determination claim if states were to
recognise the capacity of the human rights approach to transform their
relationship to the concept of self-determination. Practical examples
such as those given here show that, with the development of human
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rights cultures in domestic settings, international legal standards on
self-determination and human rights bear greatly enhanced positive
potential.

Self-determination: Process or event?
Both because the right of self-determination does not elapse with the
achievement of independence and because many self-determination
solutions can be developed within existing state arrangements, the
right ought to be conceived of as a process rather than a one-off event.
Self-determination as process represents a key means of implementing
the human rights approach to the right. A significant advantage of
conceiving of self-determination as a process is that this conception is
more open to the various means by which the right may be achieved. It
promotes a less absolutist approach to sovereignty, which is helpful for
Indigenous peoples in Australia, who typically assert self-determination
within Australia’s borders. It also addresses the concerns of those who
fear that the right can exacerbate rather than resolve conflict (Bell
2005). For example, should the two Irish jurisdictions be united, a less
absolutist approach to sovereignty might enable arrangements which
retain some aspects of the northern jurisdiction (Comerford 2003) as a
guarantee that all people on the island will be entitled to express their
identity as they wish. In the Australian context, recognition of the
right as process could involve the wider community with the notion
of Indigenous self-determination and create parallel opportunities for
reconciliation and the still absent recognition of Indigenous status.
The human rights approach to the process of self-determination also
emphasises what is perhaps the right’s central value: the balance it strikes
between universal relevance and contextually specific and culturally
appropriate application. As previously discussed, self-determination
may manifest in a wide variety of forms. As McCorquodale (2006)
recognised in our interview, the concept informing all human rights
is universal, but the exercise must always be culturally dependent.
This value of the human rights approach is particularly important for
claimants such as Indigenous peoples in Australia, whose cultural values
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are so distinct from non-Indigenous communities that their claims
for self-determination have been misunderstood by non-Indigenous
society. There is no doubt that respect for the universal application
of self-determination is essential, but the right must be capable of
adaptation to the particular circumstances of each claimant people.

Conclusion
Self-determination’s development from principle to right was ‘one
of the most dramatic normative developments of the twentieth
century’ (Falk 2000: 124). Scores of peoples around the globe have
employed the language and spirit of the right to advance their claims
for independence, thus forever associating self-determination with
the movement towards decolonisation. In the twenty-first century,
however, the status of self-determination is threatened by claims that
the right has exhausted its decolonising mission. Yet examples from the
Irish and Indigenous Australian contexts demonstrate the continuing
stifling influence of colonialism upon peoples who seek to determine
their own destinies as they see fit. This circumstance warrants the
restoration of self-determination in the present day in order that the
right may retain its emancipatory role whilst also furthering and
informing the broader framework of human rights to which every
person is entitled. A human rights approach to self-determination can
help to open international legal discourse to the voices of claimant
peoples so that their experiences are no longer marginalised and their
equal right to self-determination gains recognition and protection
into the twenty-first century.
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